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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Jered Josiah Wilson appeals from his convictions for lewd conduct with a 
child and failure to register as a sex offender. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The state charged Wilson with one count of failure to notify the sex 
offender registry of a change of address and one count of failure to complete 
annual sex offender registration in one case, and two counts of lewd conduct with 
a child in another. (R., vol. I, pp. 183-84; vol. II, pp. 314-15.) The cases were 
consolidated for trial. (R., vol. I, p. 111 ; vol. 11, p. 343.) 
At trial, Wilson moved for judgment of acquittal. (Trial Tr., p. 368, L. 24 -
p. 371, L. 1.1) The trial court reserved ruling on whether the evidence supported 
the state's charge that Wilson failed to complete annual sex offender registration. 
(Trial Tr., p. 373, L. 17 - p. 374, L. 5.) The jury convicted Wilson on all counts 
after the trial. (R., vol. 11, pp. 254-55; vol. Ill, pp. 485-86.) 
After the trial the parties briefed the reserved portion of the motion for 
judgment of acquittal regarding annual registration and the court denied the 
motion. (R., vol. 11, pp. 261-67.) The court thereafter sentenced Wilson to 
concurrent terms of ten years fixed on both sex offender registration violations 
and life with ten years fixed, also concurrent, on both counts of lewd conduct with 
a child. (R., vol. II, pp. 275-76; vol. 111, pp. 496-97.) Although the register of 
1 The trial transcript also contains the hearing on a motion in limine, a telephonic 
status conference, and the sentencing. 
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actions indicates "Appealed to the Supreme Court" within 42 days of the entry of 




Wilson states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Wilson's motion 
for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 29? 
2. Assuming arguendo, that there was a sufficient factual 
dispute as to whether Mr. Wilson needed to register annually 
in Gem County, did the district court err when it failed to 
properly instruct the jury? 
3. Was there substantial competent evidence to support Mr. 
Wilson's conviction for lewd conduct because the State 
failed to provide evidence of manual-genital contact? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 7.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. No notice of appeal time-stamped by the clerk of the district court appears 
in the appellate record. Must this appeal be dismissed because Wilson 
has failed to invoke the appellate jurisdiction of this Court? 
2. Wilson's claims of insufficient evidence and jury instruction error related to 
his conviction for failure to register annually are premised upon the state 
having some duty to prove that the sex offender registrant is still residing 
in the county of his last registration. No such element is in the applicable 
statute. Are Wilson's claims of insufficient evidence and jury instruction 
error without merit? 
3. The primary evidence of where Wilson touched the victim was her gesture 
to where he touched her. Is Wilson's argument that a gesture is 




Wilson Has Failed To Invoke The Appellate Jurisdiction Of This Court 
A Introduction 
Wilson asserts he "timely appealed from the Judgment and Commitment 
order." (Appellant's brief, p. 6.) As support for this claim he cites to the registers 
of actions containing the entry "Appealed to the Supreme Court" for August 3, 
2011 (29 days after entry of judgment) and to an Amended Notice of Appeal filed 
59 days after the judgment. (Appellant's brief, p. 6 (citing "R., pp. 34, 37, 502").) 
Because no notice of appeal bearing a date stamp within 42 days of entry of 
judgment is in the record before this Court, Wilson has failed to invoke its 
jurisdiction and the appeal must be dismissed. 
B. Standard Of Review 
'"A question of jurisdiction is fundamental; it cannot be ignored when 
brought to [the appellate court's] attention and should be addressed prior to 
considering the merits of an appeal."' State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482, 483, 80 
P.3d 1083, 1084 (2003) (quoting H & V Engineering, Inc. v. Idaho State Bd. of 
Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors, 113 Idaho 646, 648, 747 P.2d 55, 
57 (1987)). Whether a court has jurisdiction is a question of law, given free 
review. Kavaiecz, 139 Idaho at 483, 80 P.3d at 1084. 
C. The Record Does Not Establish This Court's Appellate Jurisdiction 
An appeal must be physically filed with the clerk of the district court within 
42 days of the date stamp of the order appealed from. I.AR. 14(a). A timely 
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filed notice of appeal is a prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction. State v. Payan, 
128 Idaho 866, 867, 920 P.2d 82, 83 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Fuller, 104 Idaho 
891,665 P.2d 190 (Ct. App. 1983). Any appeal based on the filing of a notice 
filed outside the 42-day filing period must be dismissed. State v. Tucker, 103 
Idaho 885, 888, 655 P .2d 92, 95 (Ct. App. 1982). The record before the 
appellate court must establish its jurisdiction. State v. Mason, 102 Idaho 866, 
867, 643 P.2d 78, 79 (1982) (record must "establish the appellate jurisdiction" of 
the court). 
In this case the only notice of appeal in the record bearing the filing stamp 
of the clerk of the district court was filed on September 2, 2011, 59 days after the 
entry of judgment. (See R., vol. II, pp. 275 Uudgment filed 7/5/2011), 283 
("Amendednotice [sic] of appeal" filed 9/2/2011); vol. Ill, pp. 496 Uudgment filed 
7/5/2011), 503 ("Amended notice [sic] of appeal" filed 9/2/2011 ).) The appellate 
record contains no notice of appeal physically filed within 42 days of the 
judgments from which Wilson appeals. Because the record does not establish 
the appellate jurisdiction of this Court, this appeal must be dismissed. 
11. 
Wilson's Claims That The State Had The Burden Of Proving His Residence To 
Establish His Failure To Annually Register By Personal Appearance Is Without 
Merit 
A. Introduction 
The state charged Wilson with failure to complete his annual sex offender 
registration. (R., vol. I, pp. 183-84.) At trial, the prosecution presented evidence 
that Wilson is a sex offender subject to registration, the state mailed the 
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registration notice to Wilson's last provided address, and that Wilson did not 
appear to perfect his annual registration. (Trial Tr., p. 174, L. 7 - p. 204, L. 22; p. 
213, L. 23- p. 228, L 8; p. 229, L 23- p. 240, L. 15; State's Exhibits 6-12.) The 
jury found him guilty of failing to annually register. (R., vol. 11, p. 255; vol. Ill, p. 
486.) 
On appeal Wilson claims that the evidence was insufficient to show he 
failed to annually register because he was no longer living in Idaho, or Gem 
County, at the time of the crime. (Appellant's brief, pp. 8-13.) In the alternative, 
he argues that the jury instructions were erroneous because they "lowered the 
state's burden of proof' by creating a presumption of a duty to register in Gem 
County or "fail[ed] to notify the jury that a person no longer has to annually 
register in Idaho if they [sic] move to a different state." (Appellant's brief, pp. 13-
19 (capitalization altered).) Neither of these arguments has merit because where 
the sex offender is actually residing at the time for annual registration is not an 
element of the crime. On the contrary, review of the statute shows it creates the 
duty to annually register with the sheriff of the county of last registration; in this 
case, Gem County. 
B. Standard Of Review 
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon 
a jury verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact 
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt. State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. 
Hart, 112 Idaho 759, 761, 735 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ct. App. 1987). In conducting 
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this review the appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to 
the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the 
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. State v. Knutson, 121 
Idaho 101, 822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991); Hart, 112 Idaho at 761, 735 P.2d at 
1072. Moreover, the facts, and inferences to be drawn from those facts, are 
construed in favor of upholding the jury's verdict. State v. Hughes, 130 Idaho 
698, 701, 946 P .2d 1338, 1341 (Ct. App. 1997); Hart, 112 Idaho at 761, 735 P .2d 
at 1072. 
Whether the jury instructions fairly and adequately present the issues and 
state the applicable law is a question of law over which this Court exercises free 
review. State v. Bush, 131 Idaho 22, 32, 951 P.2d 1249, 1259 (1997). When 
this Court reviews jury instructions, it must first determine whether the 
instructions as a whole, and not individually, fairly and accurately reflect the 
applicable law. State v. Row, 131 Idaho 303, 310, 955 P.2d 1082, 1089 (1998). 
An instruction is not error unless it misled the jury or prejudiced the complaining 
party. kt 
The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law 
over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Thompson, 140 
Idaho 796,798, 102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004); State v. Dorn, 140 Idaho 404,405, 
94 P.3d 709, 710 (Ct. App. 2004). 
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C. Whether Wilson Still Resided In Gem County Was Not An Element Of The 
Charge Of Failure To Perfect His Annual Registration 
The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative 
intent. State v. Pina, 149 Idaho 140, 144, 233 P.3d 71, 75 (2010); Robison v. 
Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 210, 76 P.3d 951, 954 (2003). Because "the 
best guide to legislative intent" is the words of the statute, the interpretation of a 
statute must begin with the literal words of the statute. State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 
326, 328, 208 P.3d 730, 732 (2009). Where the statutory language is 
unambiguous, a court does not construe it but simply follows the law as written. 
McLean v. Maverik Country Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho 810, 813, 135 P.3d 756, 759 
(2006). Thus, if the plain language of a statute is capable of only one reasonable 
interpretation, it is the Court's duty to give the statute that interpretation. Verska 
v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, _, 265 P.3d 502, 
508-09 (2011) (disavowing cases with language that Court might not give effect 
to unambiguous language of statute if such was "palpably absurd"). 
The applicable statute provided that, after the initial registration with a 
county sheriff, a sex offender "shall register annually." I.C. § 18-8307(4)(a) 
(2006). The annual registration is to be accomplished by the Idaho State Police 
mailing "an annual, nonforwardable notice of registration to the offender's last 
reported address," I. C. § 18-8307 ( 5)(b) (2006), and the offender then 
"appear[ing] in person at the office of the sheriff with jurisdiction for the purpose 
of completing the registration process," I.C. § 18-8307(5)(c) (2006). In this case, 
Wilson last registered with the Gem County Sheriff, thus the sheriff with 
jurisdiction to complete the annual registration was the Gem County Sheriff. 
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Wilson contends the sheriff with jurisdiction to complete the annual 
registration was in the county or state where he resided at the time of the mailing 
to his last address. This argument is meritless when the entirety of the statute is 
reviewed. The statute requires that the sex offender register within two working 
days in a county where he has set up new residence. I.C. § 18-8307(4)(a) 
(2006). "The offender thereafter shall register annually .... " Id. The notice for 
the annual registration shall be sent "to the offender's last reported address" and 
is "nonforwardable." I.C. § 18-8307(5)(b) (2006) (emphasis added). The 
offender then has five business days from the mailing of the notice to complete 
the annual registration with the sheriff. I.C. § 18-8307(5)(b) (2006). If the notice 
is returned, the state police "shall inform the sheriff with whom the offender last 
registered of the returned notice." I.C. § 18-8307(5)(d) (2006). Under this 
statutory scheme, if the defendant moves to another county or another state he 
must establish a new registration, and the annual registration requirement would 
trigger from that new registration. Thus, the only sheriff with whom an annual 
registration may be completed is the same sheriff where the new or annual 
registration was last completed. 
Wilson's interpretation of the statute, that an offender's failure to create a 
new registration imposes upon the state the duty to prove his residence at the 
time the notice is mailed, is flawed and inconsistent with the plain language that 
annual registration is a continuation from the last new registration. Because 
Wilson's interpretation of the statute is erroneous, his claims that the state failed 
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to present evidence to support his erroneous interpretation of the statute, or that 
the jury instructions do not reflect his erroneous view of the statute, are meritless. 
111. 
Wilson's Claim That The Victim's Gesture At Trial To Where Wilson Touched Her 
Is Insufficient Evidence Of l\llanual-Genital Contact Is Without Merit 
A. Introduction 
The state charged Wilson with lewd conduct with a child for engaging in 
manual-genital contact with the victim (his daughter) when she was seven or 
eight years old. (R, vol. 11, pp. 314-15.) During the trial the victim testified 
Wilson touched her in "an inappropriate place." (Trial Tr., p. 329, Ls. 14-22.) 
She demonstrated where Wilson touched her, and where he had her touch him, 
by pointing. (Trial Tr., p. 330, Ls. 5-1 O; p. 332, Ls. 10-21; p. 333, Ls 7-9.) She 
responded affirmatively when asked if where she was touched was her "private 
area." (Trial Tr., p. 331, Ls. 13-16; p. 336, Ls. 3-4.) The touching was on top of, 
as opposed to under, her underwear. (Trial Tr., p. 331, Ls. 17-21.) The touching 
followed Wilson unzipping or removing her pants. (Trial Tr., p. 330, Ls. 20-22; p. 
331, Ls. 3-7; p. 332, Ls. 3-4; p. 332, Ls. 10-15; p. 333, Ls. 12-19.) 
On appeal Wilson contends that because the prosecutor stated that the 
victim had pointed to her "lap area" the evidence was insufficient to prove Wilson 
touched her genitals. (Appellant's brief, pp. 21-22 (citing Trial Tr., p. 331, Ls. 13-
16; p. 332, Ls. 19-23; p. 333, Ls. 7-11).) This argument fails because the 
appellate court cannot reinterpret the jury's determination of what the victim's 
indications meant. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon 
a jury verdict if there is substant!al evidence upon which a rational trier of fact 
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 712, 215 P.3d 414, 432 (2009) 
(citations omitted). "[S]ubstantial evidence may exist even when the evidence 
presented is solely circumstantial or when there is conflicting evidence." ~ In 
conducting its review, the appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the 
jury as to the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or 
the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. ~ Moreover, the 
facts, and inferences to be drawn from those facts, are construed in favor of 
upholding the jury's verdict. ~ 
C. The Evidence That Wilson Unzipped Or Removed The Victim's Pants And 
Then Touched Her In An Area Demonstrated By Gesture Is Sufficient To 
Support The Verdict 
Lewd conduct on a child includes manual-genital contact. I.C. § 18-1508. 
As set forth above, the victim testified that Wilson unzipped or removed her pants 
and touched her on top of her underwear in an "inappropriate" or private place, 
which she indicated by gesture. This evidence is sufficient to support the jury's 
verdict finding Wilson guilty of lewd conduct by touching her genitals. To hold 
otherwise would be to draw inferences against the verdict based on a physical 
indication the jury saw and this Court did not. Wilson's argument that the jury 
was required to infer from the evidence that the touching did not involve the 
victim's genitals is contrary to the applicable standard of appellate review. See 
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State v. Miller, 131 Idaho 288,292, 955 P.2d 603, 607 (Ct. App. 1997) (Court will 
not substitute its view of the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the 
evidence but will instead construe reasonable inferences in favor of upholding 
the verdict). Drawing reasonable inferences in favor of the jury's verdict, as this 
Court must, shows that the evidence is sufficient and that Wilson's appellate 
claim must be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgments of 
conviction. 
DATED this 7th day of January, 2013. 
KENNETH K. JOR · E EN 
Deputy Attorney G 
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